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ABSTRACT

Most scholarly literature on school desegregation treats opposition to busing as racist, reactionary, or as springing from deeper condivions of alienation or anomie. From this viewpoint, anti-busing demonstrations are episodic, unorganized and not founded on any thoroughgoing comprehension of the immediate policy issue. Busing is merely the triggering event which releases the individual's anger at social injustice. A case study of opposition to busing in Los Angeles (surveying its leadership, members, activities, and organizational characteristics) challenges this description. The account of the anti-busing movement which views it in terms of the collective mass behavior outbursts hypothesized by mass society theories is found to be inappropriate. The reasons individuals join and participate in anti-busing organizations appear to be quite different from the "symbolically racist" characteristics which correlate with verbal opposition to busing in public opinion surveys. Given the undesirability of white flight, anti-busing claimants should be included in pluralistic bargaining over the desegregation plan. (Author/WI)

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POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT: THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION ISSUE IN LOS ANGELES

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ABSTRACT

Popular Participation and Representation in the Urban Environment:
The School Desegregation Issue in Los Angeles

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Most scholarly literature on school desegregation treats opposition to busing as racist, ambiguously reactionary, or as springing from deeper conditions of alienation or anomie, hence essentially irrational or hopelessly inappropriate. On this analysis, anti-busing demonstrations, like many outbursts of collective mass behavior, are episodic, unorganized, and not founded on any thorough-going comprehension of the immediate policy issue. Busing is merely the triggering event which releases the anomic individual's sense of anger at "the injustice of the universe."

This paper, a case study of opposition to busing in Los Angeles, surveys its leadership, members, organizational characteristics and activities in an effort to test this description. The account of the anti-busing movement which views it in terms of the collective mass behavior outbursts hypothesized by mass society theories is found to be inappropriate. Moreover, the reasons individuals join and participate in anti-busing organizations appear to be quite different from the "symbolically racist" characteristics which correlate with verbal opposition to busing in public opinion surveys. Given the undesirability of white flight--the "exit" response to policy dissatisfaction--the paper argues for considering stimulating the "voice" option by including anti-busing claimants in pluralistic bargaining over the desegregation plan.

POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION IN THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT: THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION ISSUE IN LOS ANGELES

> Perhaps what characterizes political life is precisely the problem of continually *creating* unity, a public, in a context of diversity, rival claims, unequal power, and conflicting interests. In the absence of rival claims and conflicting interests, a topic never enters the political realm; no political decision needs to be made. But for the political collectivity, the "we" to act, those conflicting claims must be resolved in a way that continues to preserve the collectivity.
>
> Pitkin, *Wittgenstein and Justice*

INTRODUCTION: MASS MOVEMENT OR POLITICAL ORGANIZATION?

During the first week of 1977, the Citizens Advisory Committee on School Integration, at the instruction of the Los Angeles school board, delivered to the board a proposal calling for extensive mandatory busing in order to comply with a court order to desegregate the district's schools. Sometime during the following week, a small group of "concerned mothers" decided to organize a one-day school boycott in their neighborhood. The boycott would serve both to protest the work of the board's committee (which they saw as stacked on the liberal side from the beginning), and to signal the board that any plan involving large-scale busing was not going to have their acquiescence. The neighborhood was the Sunland-Tujunga area, a lower middle and working class suburb whose schools, enrolling about 8000 children, are included in the Los Angeles Unified School District. On the day of the boycott, January 21, almost 5000 students were absent. With ten percent the usual absence rate, more than half the area's enrollment was kept out of school for the boycott.[1] The organizers intimated an anti-busing effort which exceeded the bounds of their own neighborhood, telling reporters and other observers that a city-wide boycott was slated for the following month.

District leaders had hoped that by ignoring the Sunland boycott in its planning stage they would deprive it of needed publicity and an active opponent. By early February, when plans for a district-wide boycott were everywhere an open secret, school officials chose the opposite tactic. In a statement endorsed by the school board and distributed to all schools, the City Attorney, County District Attorney, Chief of Police and the County Bar Association called on parents not to involve their children in any boycott of city schools.[2] Two days

before the scheduled boycott, city school officials released a statement, carried widely in the media, vowing that any leader or leaders of the school boycott would be prosecuted.[3] In spite of these warnings, nearly 150,000 children stayed away from school on the day of the boycott, with about half these absences--or about 12 to 14 percent of the district's enrollment--conservatively attributable to the boycott. Since there was very little minority participation in the boycott, and since whites constitute only about 35 percent of district enrollment, it is possible to argue that something between a third and half of the relevant population participated in the boycott. The strike was most successful in white areas of the San Fernando Valley and in the Harbor area. Participation was no respector of class lines, with the greatest excess over normal absenteeism in the relatively wealthy north and west Valley, but with nearly comparable rates further south and east in less affluent areas.[4]

Especially in view of the fact that no plan had been approved by the board, and that early responses by board members to the Citizens Committee plan depicted it as much more ambitious than the board wanted, the widespread participation in the boycott surprised observers on both sides of the issue. Even so, the timing of the boycotts was faultless. Confronted by an extensive Citizens Committee plan from which they were already retreating, board members were presented with an impressive show of strength from the adherents of a viewpoint which had, frankly, not been well-represented on the committee. Moreover, the terms of three of the seven board members would expire in April and talk of a "new majority" on the board was gaining unwonted credibility. The board's response was dramatic: they abandoned the Citizens Committee report altogether, some criticizing its members unofficially for not being sufficiently open to community opinion; and they scheduled public hearings at several local schools in order to gather their own information for an alternative plan.

The plan which eventuated from two weeks of further board deliberation was unrecognizable in terms of the Committee's original report. The novel proposal laid heavy emphasis on voluntarism, with no mandatory busing slated until the second year, and it envisioned mandatory programs as limited to "integrated learning centers" where students would spend approximately nine weeks a year. Civil rights groups, including the plaintiffs in the case, were sharply critical, noting that the core of the plan consisted of "a glorified field trip."[5] Opponents of large-scale busing were generally favorable. Roberta Weintraub, a conservative running against an outspoken board liberal, said, "Obviously we won...I'm pleased that the political pressure put on the board...forced them to fulfill their

commitment to give us a voluntary option before shoving any mandatory programs down our throats."[6] In interviews after approving the plan, board members agreed that the public hearings were a critical factor in their deliberations. While the two board liberals thought that their colleagues had over-reacted to pressure from white areas, the four members of the center-right coalition which passed the plan saw concerns about long bus rides and the paucity of voluntary features in the earlier proposal as worries voiced by parents in all parts of the city. Moreover, the critical votes behind the limited plan were swayed by a differentiated view of the anti-busing forces, rather than simply impressed with the intensity of the outcry. Board member Julian Nava gave this analysis.

> Some of the opposition to busing was poorly disguised racism; it was really more fear. But much of the opposition to busing was a truly valid objection to having something forced on you before you can try to do it yourself.

Kathleen B. Rice saw the two main messages emerging from the hearings to be concerns with voluntarism and with time and distance on the buses, both issues on which she later took forceful positions with the whole board. She saw the villians of the hearings on both ends of the political spectrum.

> I have lost my tolerance for those who shouted at us in the hearings, for those who said, "Hell no, we won't go." I don't buy that. But I also have strong feelings about those who, in the name of righteousness, have shown a certain arrogance to basic human and paternal feelings, whether of blacks, browns, or whites.

In later meetings of the full board, the concern with representing in the plan significant features of voluntarism and time limitations on bus trips became the focal point of the debate. Even after the board's first alternative was rejected by the judge as inadequate, their later, more extensive plan included a substantial voluntary component and stringent limitations on time and distance.

In his perceptive study of school board decision-making on desegregation in Chicago, Peterson finds a set of facts similar to these--initial approval of an integration plan, followed by public outcry and then by rejection of the plan--but he cautions strongly against inferring "a causal connection between outside pressure and board behavior."[7] He argues that nine of the ten board members had stable voting records over the period. He bases his attribution of the behavior of the

crucial tenth member (as I have) on the representative's own explanation for his changed opinion: that he had re-calculated the probable effect of the plan on racial stability. "Only in this sense can he be said to have been pressured into withdrawing support for the superintendent's plan."[8]

Peterson suggests that the more surprising outcome would have been for the board members to have given serious consideration to the demands of the anti-busing forces. Because these demands were unyieldingly principled, phrased so as to brook no compromise, and expressed in a fashion which showed no appreciation for the give-and-take of the political process, their function as "a message from the electorate" might carry some weight but could hardly transmit content.[9] This view of the anti-busing forces is captured by Cyrus Adams III, the Chicago board's tenth vote.

> I don't think the spirit of Jesus Christ could change the minds of people or allay their anti-Negro fears and prejudices. To me they have just confirmed their philosophy about their schools: "suffer the little children to come unto them, as long as they are not black."[10]

Whether Chicago's integration plan was scrapped *despite* "outside pressure," or whether the anti-busing opposition exercised influence on the outcome only because it amounted to a potential electoral bludgeon, the striking feature of the process is the equanimity with which the specific demands and opinions of an overwhelming majority are excluded from respresentations. Pitkin's definition makes the requisites of substantive representation clear:

> The representative must act in such a way that there is no conflict [between representative and represented], or if it occurs, an explanation is called for. He must not be found persistently at odds with the wishes of the represented without good reason in terms of their interest, without a good explanation of why their wishes are not in accord with their interest.[11]

Liberals do, of course, have an explanation for the persistent conflict between desegregation policy and majority preferences: it is that opposition to busing is an essentially racist and irrational mass-based intrusion on an elite policy-making process which considers the long-term interests of the society as a whole. This interpretation looks to both the substance and the style of the anti-busing movement. Seeing little but obstructionism and uncompromising demands for the reversal of established policy, the elite response tends toward mollification

rather than representation, toward information-dissemination rather than consultation. The experience of a number of cities, particularly those in which violence has occurred over school desegregation lends credence to the interpretation.

Much of the scholarly literature on school desegregation treats opposition to busing as racist, ambiguously reactionary, or as springing from deeper conditions of alienation or anomie, hence essentially irrational or hopelessly inappropriate. On this analysis, anti-busing demonstrations, like many outbursts of collective mass behavior, are episodic, unorganized, and not founded on any thorough-going comprehension of the immediate policy issue. Busing is merely the "triggering event" which relases (or provides a rationale for venting) the anomic individual's sense of anger at "the injustice of the universe."[12]

Indeed, even Rubin's *Busing and Backlash*, obviously sympathetic to the blue collar opposition which finally ousted the liberals in Richmond, describes that opposition in terms often surprisingly consistent with traditional theories of collective behavior. While the conservatives in Richmond are not "working class authoritarians"; they are relatively likely "...probably because they are more prejudiced on matters of race...to project their own feelings onto external events, distorting the events to make them fit their beliefs." The most fundamental aspect of the Richmond story, the take-over of the traditionally liberal middle class school board by a clear conservative working class majority, is seen as "the failure of liberalism," rather than as a positive achievement by an identifiable alternative political force. Given the political disorganization of the conservatives, it is a contest of malevolently bumbling brute strength against a liberal faction both ideologically and tactically immobilized.[13] In the final analysis, Rubin suggests that, although the racism of Richmond's working class population is understandable in terms of their place in the social structure, it would have been preferable to present a desegregated school system as a *fait accompli*, rather than letting the issue become a topic of public debate.[14]

Liberal policy-makers can learn little from their opponents: "...if people are given the opportunity, they will oppose any *real* plan (i.e., one that would require non-token compliance)."[15] Public hearings or other attempts to discover the opinions of busing opponents, or to include them in the process of drawing up the plan, will result merely in shouting matches. Of course, policy-makers cannot run rough-shod over these constituents--if only for fear of being deposed at the next election or, more immediately, of having them take to the streets

again. However, the assumption that there are no specific, negotiable grievances makes anticipating the response to policy a highly error-prone process.

There is an alternative to this interpretation of anti-busing sentiment. The alternative suggests that, at least in some cities at some times, opposition to busing is neither anomic and irrational nor necessarily racist and reactionary. It follows that, unlike the "mass society" interpretation of the school desegregation conflict, this one hypothesizes that opposition to busing may well be characterized by organization into identifiable political groups with some historical continuity and equipped with a reasonably logical preception of the underlying issue. The policy implications of this interpretation are similarly opposed to those of the mass society description. In this case, the claims of unfair or inadequate representation in the policy process must be taken seriously; within the bounds of the law, the claimants' opinions must be considered carefully and, if possible, enacted in whole or in part.

The difference between these two interpretations has a significance which goes beyond the immediate policy advice following from it, however, Intense political conflict places in relief those questions of political obligation, legitimacy, and the bounds of the political community which, under normal conditions, lay quietly obscured by consensus. The first inclination is to perceive large-scale protests or social movements as unwarranted--illegitimate--breaks in the consensual fabric. Hence, for example, contemporary interpretations of support for Joseph McCarthy saw that support as irrational or illegitimate, while later studies have confuted that interpretation.[16] Early analyses of the anti-war movement of the 1960's saw it as a threat to political civility; while later studies have shown its participants and their tactics to be quite unlike the mass society image.[17] A similar clash of interpretations can be found in the case of civil rights protests and ghetto riots, with one explanation stressing "rioting mainly for fun and profit"; another veiwing protest and riot as rational and possible even sophisticated actions in an unresponsive political situation.[18] The "revisionist" interpretations in each of these contrasts, like the more recent work of Gamson, and of Tilly and his colleagues[19] suggest that the politics of many social protest movements are as rational and goal-oriented as the "normal" politics of parties and pressure groups. Gamson, for instance, is concerned

> to break through the distinction between the two kinds of politics according to which movements are caused by social disorganization, are nonrational or irrational in their purposes, conditions and consequences, and should be interpreted in largely symbolic terms

> because the connection between their interests and actions is so indirect; while normal politics, that of parties and pressure groups, is organized rational bargaining.[20]

Political activity on either side of the distinction differs not because the underlying laws of their behavior differ--one pathological, the other utilitarian--but rather because their political situations are different.

The difference between these two realms revolves around the notion of "membership" in the relevant political community.[21] The concept of "pluralist bargaining" introduced by Greenstone and Peterson[22] captures the idea of membership. Normal politics is the politics of recognized, established interests. "Members" are those whose interests are "vested" or "institutionalized"--whose views and claims are taken into account when decisions affecting those interests are made. All polities have some non-members--children are not consulted about rules regarding them; while other groups, like the poor, have no organized group to protect their interests for more subtle reasons. The notion of *permeability*[23] leads to a focus on the boundary-maintaining behavior of members in response to the mobilization of non-members. When non-members with some stake in the outcome of a collective decision mobilize and organize, they generally must struggle against members who will not readily concede the right to be heard. From this perspective, illegitimate political tactics are often the only alternative to failure for challenging groups on the outside of a privileged boundary.

These studies of social movements from a broadly post-pluralist perspective provide a set of alternative hypotheses to the traditional collective behavior and mass society interpretations of protest. Specifically, if the anti-busing movement is animated by the diffuse discontents of alienated and anomic individuals, then the movement should be characterized by lack of organization, episodic activity, and goals which are broad and unfocused. Attempts by policy-makers to accede to their demands will prove chimerical, since the proximate issue which seems to provoke the protest activity is not its real cause at all. Importantly enough, elites would seem to be justified in excluding these demands from the realm of "vested" or represented interests of the polity when those demands challenge other legitimate allocations. The appropriate response for political leaders to such a movement would be in terms of increasing social control, rather than in terms of widening representation in the policy-making process. Taylor and Stinchcombe argue such an interpretation in the Boston case.[24] Suppose, however, that the anti-busing movement is in fact motivated by a proximate concern with the costs

of the plan itself, and that its apparently illegitimate tactics are occasioned more by prior exclusion from the decision-making process than by the irrationality or hostility of its adherents. If this is the case, then we can expect the anti-busing movement to look like other political organizations: to distribute selective incentives, possibly under the direction of a "political entrepreneur"; to show some degree of bureaucratization and centralization, which should provide continuity over time; to have specific and limited goals; and, possibly, to be willing to coalesce with other like-minded groups. If the anti-busing movement is a political organization by the usual criteria, then--especially in view of its arguably representing the majority opinion--excluding this faction from decision-making about school desegregation will be much less justifiable than if its adherents can be shown to constitute little more than a vehement mass.

OPPOSITION TO BUSING IN LOS ANGELES: ORCHESTRATING MASS PARTICIPATION

At first glance, the congeries of anti-busing groups (or at least associations with published names) in Los Angeles seem to show a classically fissiparous social movement, but to give little comfort to the analysis of an organized political force. A survey of press coverage over the two-year period since the California Supreme Court's *Crawford* decision in July, 1976, reveals five groups which have played more than a trivial or passing role in the controversy. These groups have existed for at least three months and have taken part in at least two recognizable public activities (rallies, appearances at public hearings or before the board, running or prominently sponsoring candidates for public office, etc.). Closer analysis, however, shows these groups to be drawn from the same membership pool, to engage in activities which would be impossibly well-coordinated if the groups were genuinely independent, and, in fact, to be linked at the elite level by a small network of "overlapping directors." In this section each of these associations--Bustop, CHOICE, Friends of Ferraro, NANS (Los Angeles Chapter), and United Parents Against Forced Busing--will be described briefly. Then these separate pieces will be combined into an interconnected image which more closely resembles the political situation in the Los Angeles busing controversy.

The "Minor" Anti-Busing Groups

Friends of Ferraro. Friends of Ferraro is, as the name implies, little more than the on-going campaign organization of Richard Ferraro, the school board's arch-conservative and for many years the conservative bastion on a typically

middle class liberal board. "Friends" enjoys a special place among anti-busing groups, however, simply because its members have been loyal to the cause for so much longer than the other groups and have, consequently, picked up a good deal of useful intelligence about the sources of potential anti-busing support and about the politics of making themselves heard. In the months just following the *Crawford* decision, Friends of Ferraro contributed to the emergence of other groups by sharing mailing lists and occasionally advice. This strategy helped both parties: it allowed the new group to avoid being associated with a particular political leader, and it fostered the involvement of potential new workers/voters for the candidate.[25]

Two years later, however, the group is referred to by other anti-busing leaders as hampered by its dependence on Ferraro, whose brand of conservatism consists essentially of intransigent obstructionism on most matters before the board. Particularly after the election of Bobbi Fiedler to the board in mid-1977, the bulk of the anti-busing opposition prefers to work with a member who can occasionally force the liberals to retreat by holding out the possibility of compromise. Although Friends of Ferraro is still included on planning councils, its relatively small size, close links to a particular school board member, and narrow electoral concerns keep it from occupying a central role.

CHOICE. Twice since the *Crawford* ruling, State Senator Alan Robbins has introduced into the legislature a referendum proposal to amend the California state constitution to prevent the California Supreme Court from going beyond the U.S. Supreme Court in requiring schools to desegregate. In general, the California court has been much more activist than the national body, ruling that districts must take all reasonably feasible steps to desegregate, regardless of whether past or present intent to segregate can be proved. The effect of the amendment on subsequent litigation would be dramatic: by placing a heavier evidentiary burden on the plaintiffs and by requiring that state courts at all levels find intent to segregate before remedy can be ordered, both the number of challenging cases and the number of successful ones would drop. The effect of the amendment, if passed, on Los Angeles is problematical, however: it could not affect implementation in September, 1978, although it might inhibit later attempts to expand the plan.

When this measure failed to garner the necessary legislative majority during the 1977 session, Robbins decided to circumvent the legislative process by gathering enough signatures to place the proposal on the November, 1978 ballot as an

initiative. Together with Los Angeles school board member Fiedler, Robbins founded CHOICE (Californians Helping to Obtain Individual Choices in Education), in fall, 1977, to campaign for the initiative and to supervise circulating the petitions. The initiative seemed promising, even though the time for gathering signatures was short. The Jarvis property-tax initiative was in the last stages of a successful petition campaign and, as one anti-busing leader told me: "Most of these people don't give a hoot for politics, but they care about two issues: property taxes and busing. And they feel strongly enough to work for those."

In the early months, the CHOICE initiative campaign seemed headed for success, making steady if not dramatic progress. The organization was visibly active, sponsoring a number of rallies and securing substantial volunteer labor from Bustop and from the Jarvis campaign. Well before the deadline, however, contributions of both work and money fell off; the outcome began to look less promising, making recruiting even more difficult, and the campaign eventually failed. Its politically voluble sponsor, Alan Robbins, has consequently been deprived of the stable forum from which he sought to speak out against busing. While CHOICE probably would have become an important independent force in the anti-busing movement if the initiative had qualified for the ballot, and while the organization remains an identifying tag for several prominent anti-busing leaders, it currently has no visible activities.

NANS. Across the country, the National Association for Neighborhood Schools has chapters in 36 states and claims 350,000 to 400,000 members. The group concentrates on lobbying in the legislative arena, mainly at state and national levels, with the eventual goal to stop mandatory busing by way of a U.S. Constitutional amendment or federal legislation. While organizers and literature from NANS emphasize the fact that a national association gives it more clout, the local organization has been unable to attract many new participants or to convert many members of Bustop or the United Parents group. The President of the local chapter claims "several thousand" members, but other anti-busing leaders close to the organization suggest that this figure inflates the actual by a factor of ten. Most members of NANS, moreover, are also members of Bustop.

Although the role of NANS as a unique association in the Los Angeles busing controversy has not been great, it has made two important contributions. First, its links to the resources of its national parent group--especially attorneys and academic experts willing to assist anti-busing groups--have fostered critical contributions from NANS to planning strategy for the umbrella anti-busing cause

in Los Angeles. The local leaders of NANS, all former or current Bustop activists, have cooperated willingly with other groups in the area on a number of projects, from public meetings to suggestions about legal strategies in the current hearings on the plan. Second, because NANS already exists as a credible organizational entity, its claim to legitimacy as a representative of anti-busing opinion in Los Angeles is stronger than that of other groups which, though indigenous, are not so well-established. A national image made up for local weakness during a nearly fatal financial crisis of the Bustop group in 1977: NANS was nearly always the first organization mentioned to take over Bustop's role in court hearings on the desegregation plan.[26]

United Parents Against Forced Busing. A fourth group, United Parents Against Forced Busing (also called United Parents Against Busing), was formed late in 1977, by several former Bustop activists. Although the situation surrounding the formation of the group will be described below when the Bustop organization is investigated in more detail, it should be noted that UPAFB is a direct outgrowth of the older group. After a severe organizational crisis culminating in October, 1977, Bustop shifted its tactis to emphasize litigation almost exclusively. This change left a realm of important activity--the demonstrative, expressive, public opinion-oriented engagement which had formed the core of Bustop's early image--leaderless. Bustop executives felt that this was an important part of the tactical repertoire of the anti-busing movement and encouraged a previously peripheral member of the executive committee to head the new group. This pattern of organizational genesis, rather than the origin as a splinter group intent on "out-radicalizing" the previous generation, is unusual among anti-busing organizations and tends to cast doubt on the depiction of the Los Angeles anti-busing movement as a series of more or less spontaneous outbursts.

United Parents has held several successful rallies since its inception, all attended by several hundred people. Since information about these events is generally passed by widely publicized notices or by mailings from a list shared by Bustop with several other groups, it is not surprising that most members of United Parents are Bustop adherents. Leaders of the new group seem unconcerned about organizational autonomy, even going so far as to solicit contributions for Bustop at their public functions.

Bustop

By far the largest and best-organized association involved in the busing controversy is Bustop, a city-wide group with greatest membership strength in the San

Fernando Valley and the Harbor area. Bustop is not only acknowledged within the anti-busing movement to be its dominant entity, but it is treated by local power-holders and civic influentials as the legitimate representative of anti-busing interests. It is appropriate, then, that we mount an investigation more detailed than those for other groups into the origins, leaders, members and tactics which characterize this central organization in the anti-busing movement in Los Angeles.

Origins and Membership. Bustop began almost accidently, out of a group of neighborhood parents concerned with what they perceived to be capricious school policy. Early in 1976, a group of elementary school parents in the upper middle class San Fernando Valley community of Woodland Hills noticed that a particular fifth grade class had had three different teachers over a period little more than half the school term. Their principal, when quizzed about the rapid turnover, responded vaguely that the new teachers did not seem to adjust well to the school. The parents' suspicion about the reason for the adjustment problems was confirmed by the Area Superintendent, who explained that the problem was an increasingly common outcome of the district's new mandatory teacher transfer policy, undertaken at HEW order to desegregate the teaching staff of the district. He went on to warn that parents had better get accustomed to change, for their children were going to be reassigned in September.

Alarmed, the parents--most of them already active in the local Parent-Teacher Association--convinced the advisory council of the local PTA to appoint a fact-finding committee to look into the problem. The committee, chaired by Bobbi Fiedler, a Woodland Hills housewife, did not take long to confirm the parents' fears. One activist recalled: "Everyone thought: 'Nothing is ever going to happen on school desegregation here.' And even if it did, they couldn't believe the Valley would be involved with those schools downtown--they're so far away!" Startled out of their complacency, they resolved to "fight City Hall." They adopted a catchy name, elected officers, and through the PTA network, began to publicize their existence and to look for other groups of parents with similar concerns.

Bustop grew quickly after the California Supreme Court's *Crawford* ruling the following summer, with new chapters being organized in every community in the San Fernando Valley. By the time the 1976-77 school year was well underway, the organization had active members or chapters in virtually every Valley school, and pockets of strength throughout the district, particularly in the Harbor area. Bustop has never been a centralized, city-wide organization in the sense that forming chapters, electing officers, or even deciding on local policy is under

the direction of the larger organization's executive. Instead, participation has been encouraged on the basis of no further requisite than the shared antipathy to mandatory busing. The result has been a widely disparate membership, with vastly different personal histories of political participation and even of partisanship, but linked by a deep suspiciousness about government intervention in school desegregation. One anti-busing leader evoked a sense of the breadth of his constituency by describing its members:

> In the West Valley, it's like being at a professional convention or a play at the Music Center--there are doctors, lawyers, people from the movie industry--but in Sunland or San Pedro, it's more like being in a bar patronized by truckers or fishermen...except that they bring their wives.

The executives of the nascent group, then, did not attempt to direct the establishment of new chapters. They were much more eager to tap already-existing networks of parental and neighborhood communication, to nudge these toward a concern with busing (never far below the surface during this period), and to facilitate their loose, contributing membership in the larger organization.

Studies of community conflict and collective behavior converge in their emphasis on the importance of building political organizations on the basis of established community groups or familiar networks of personal interaction. In the anti-busing movement, the prior group structure of PTA's and neighborhood friendship networks served several important purposes. First, the existing group structure acts as a residue of historical concerns and conflicts: by serving as a foundation for the new group, it channels the pattern of the emerging conflict.[27] Organizing on the basis of neighborhood PTA's meant that school-related concerns were foremost among the members' common interests. This eased the shift from individual problems in the local school to a common problem at the level of the district. Moreover, it fostered unity as "concerned parents" across a set of class and status divisions which in other situations would have produced rancor. It is significant in this respect that Bustop leaders have never forced the issue of unity within the organization. For instance, there has never been a city-wide (or even Valley-wide) rally, and local (Bustop-based) campaign headquarters in Fiedler's bid for election to the school board enjoyed considerable autonomy. General meetings of the organization are infrequent (nearly a year elapsed between the most recent and its predecessor) and clearly structured, so that the class

differences in expressive styles and preferences for political tactis which are so prominent at rallies are muted without being stifled. The great strength of these loose ties, of course, is that they allow the group to concert the members' activities without building a common base of assumptions, opinions and intentions for that action.

Second, as Oberschall points out, prior group unity facilitates mobilization.[28] Newly mobilizing conflict groups can reduce their organizational costs by building, intentionally or unintentionally, on existing communication patterns. Shared interests will not produce collective action without organization. But mobilizing and organizing without an established base is expensive in terms of time, resources and entrepreneurial skills--costs which can be avoided by a group which begins from a set of members already linked by some related interest.

Third, the presence of a pre-existing group structure which retains a substantial amount of its autonomy within the new organization is all the more important in the case of a collective action which is not closely regulated by a bureaucratic structure. Particularly in protest situations, where the activity of group members may be a shifting combination of the legal and illegal, formal, centralized communications decline in importance while word-of-mouth communication along established networks rises in prominence. In such situations

> ...there is a tremendous outpouring of words, pamphlets, posters, and meetings, but communication and influence take place in small groups of neighbors, coworkers, associates, and so on... Contemporary research has discovered the great importance of small groups and local influentials in routine mass communication process. Their importance is perhaps even greater in the period of mobilization for collective behavior episodes.[29]

Stages of Growth. Bobbi Fiedler is generally described in the media as the "founder" of the organization--a title and reputation which aided immensely in her electoral bid for the school board seat she now holds. While this is strictly correct, it would be a mistake to consider her role to be that of the "political entrepreneur" as that concept has developed in the literature. Paradoxically enough, while the founder was not an entrepreneur, the entrepreneurial activity of a later organizational leader was crucial to the life of the group. Bustop has, then, passed through two distinct stages of organizational development, with consequent effects on its activities.

The first stage in the group's organizational development covers the period from its formation until October, 1977, a period of just over one and a half years.

The development of the group during this period follows quite closely the predictions of equilibrium theories of interest groups typified by Truman.[30] Truman begins with the notion that shared attitudes grow out of and are reinforced by interaction. As interaction increases, it is stabilized by the formation of an organization. The basic factor in the theory must then account for the growth in frequency and intensity of interaction which leads to forming the association. That factor is "the disruption of established patterns of behavior." Disruptions or disturbances to the equilibrium conditions of the "potential group" can take a variety of forms, but are usually threats or new disadvantages which would be suffered by the sector of society which makes up the constituency for the group.[31] From this perspective, the organizer or founder of the group is historically dispensable: if this leader had not formalized this particular association, another would have emerged.

The early history of Bustop seems to bear out this theory. First, extant patterns of interaction and shared attitudes were present in the form of PTA's and neighborhood networks, and these provided a critical base upon which the organization developed. Second, specific plans or court orders for desegregating the schools by a particular date clearly constitute a disturbance in a relatively stable segregated social equilibrium. The California Supreme Court's rejection of the Los Angeles school board's final appeal in *Crawford* places the disturbance at July, 1976. Third, although Fiedler has a good sense of political timing and admirable organizational skills, she is not in any major way causally necessary for the explanation of the emergence of a core group for the anti-busing movement. At the time the Bustop organization was formed from the Woodland Hills PTA committee, a number of other groups were taking shape throughout the white areas of the city in response to the court order. The Woodland Hills group was articulate, well-connected enought to be able to publicize its members' concerns, and quicker to adopt the trappings of formal association than were groups in other neighborhoods. Moreover, to the extent that the concept of the political entrepreneur connotes some measure of personal indispensability for the emergence of a given group,[32] the notion is inappropriate to Fiedler's case. Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of the anti-busing movement in Los Angeles is its wealth of individuals with organizational and political skills and the time, money and inclination to spend them on this issue.[33] The substitutability of one potential leader for another in the early stages of a movement, however, hardly decreases the very

real role distance assumed by the founder of a successful organization. Fiedler is now nearly as much a symbol of the anti-busing movement as Bustop itself, and she is occasionally in the position of being able to use her established political reputation to shore up the group when it falters.

Once established, Bustop enjoyed a number of early successes. The moderation of the Citizens Committee proposal by the board in light of its public hearings was popularly attributed to the well-orchestrated participation of Bustop members at meetings in all parts of the city. Moreover, although groups leaders would not discuss their role in the protests, community influentials on both sides of the busing issue were quite certain that Bustop had fostered, if not instigated, the school boycotts during the period when the board was formulating its initial desegregation plan. The group's power in the electoral arena was demonstrated with less ambiguity in the April, 1977, primary elections, when the school board seats of three incumbents were at stake. Fiedler ran, in a field of seven candidates, against the board's most outspoken white liberal, Robert Doctor. Although the other two incumbents were also forced into runoff elections, Doctor's vote total was the lowest of the three--36 percent to Fiedler's 24 percent. The general election in May found Richard Ferraro, the board's right wing, and Howard Miller, then taking a center-right position on the board, joined by Fiedler, whose grass roots support simply overwhelmed the somewhat tepid backing enjoyed by Doctor. Finally, as the popularly acknowledged representative of anti-busing opinion, the group sought, and on appeal was granted, the right to full participation as an intervenor in the court hearings on the desegregation plan. If Bustop had not by this time established itself as the predominant group in the area, this new strategic victory confirmed that role. Legal recognition of the organization's status and importance may have been a strategic victory, but it forced a severe organizational crisis in terms of the group's political tactics. It is appropriate to think of this point as beginning a second stage in the life of the organization.

Until the group received official recognition as a party to the case, in May, 1977, the association's members and virtually all its leaders viewed litigation as an option of minor importance among a set of tactics which emphasized mass-based electoral or civil protest behavior. During this period, in fact, there was some pressure from local chapters for participation in potentially violent episodes, a tactical choice which surely would have gained in attractiveness if anti-busing representatives had not been publicly co-opted into the court case.[34] The commitment to participation in the case required a major re-allocation of resources by

group leaders, and it changed in fundamental ways the set of incentives members received from the group. Without a highly successful alteration in its basic organizational structure, particularly in the pattern of relations between leaders and members, Bustop was in danger of losing its ability to act at precisely the moment when its action could be most effective. At the same time, Fiedler responded to her new position of public responsibility on the board by withdrawing from the group and refusing to take part in either organizational governance or fund-raising.

In terms of leadership, Bustop no longer needed a typical concerned parent to symbolize its members' involvement; it needed a shrewd fund-raiser who was willing to let the group's activities be dictated by the claims of its legal strategy, yet who would maintain close enoght ties to members to sustain the higher level of financial contributions necessary for active legal participation. While this sort of oligarchic purposive organization is not unusual, especially among upper middle class public interest lobbying groups, it is unexpected in an arena characterized as the province of uncoordinated collective behavior episodes by outraged working and lower class whites.[35] For months, the leadership floundered and debated, even resolving in October, 1977, to dissolve the group.[36] In debt to the attorneys who had secured its position on the case and without further revenue sources to continue, organizational suicide seemed the best course.

It was at this point that Paul Clark, a political activist who had managed a number of campaigns (including Fiedler's) decided that it was up to him to rescue the organization. Working intently over the next five months, he managed an unprecedentedly successful set of fund-raising solicitations by mail, divested the organization of an important subsidiary activity which was no longer relevant to its major goal, and brought Fiedler as well as a number of other anti-busing leaders back to active campaigning for the group.

Clark matches the pattern of the economically-rational political entrepreneur almost perfectly. First, he is surprisingly distant from the substantive goals of the organization and not particularly aware of the political situation surrounding desegregation in Los Angeles. Second, he has a well-honed ability to bring together economic and political resources to support the organization. Frolich, Oppenheimer and Young noted that the free-rider argument generally defeats collective action for a common goal unless an entrepreneur finds it profitable to foster provision of the collective good.

> In such cases, the crucial function of the entrepreneur is to provide a mechanism for the pooling of resources. Moreover, to the extent that the entrepreneur can act as a coordinating mechanism..., his ability to make a profit may be enhanced. Such an individual would be acting as a political leader, supplying positively valued collective goods for a profit.[37]

Clark derives "profit" from his Bustop activities in terms of two distinct currencies. First, as an aspiring political campaign manager, he is establishing both visibility and a reputation for effectiveness with precisely the sort of conservative candidates and potential candidates with whom he works best.

Under Clark, the group has re-emerged as the center of a formal coalition--United Organizations for Neighborhood Schools--which acts as an umbrella coordinating group for Friends of Ferraro, NANS, CHOICE, and United Parents Against Busing. Clark has convinced both Fiedler and Ferraro to appear in support of the group, and both now regularly endorse fund-raising letters and participate in public rallies for the organization. Finally, the executive committee of Bustop during this period has actively encouraged the diversification of the anti-busing movement into a number of functionally specific organizations which concert their activity through United Organizations. United Parents is the most notable example of this diversification, but a newly-emerging group, Families Organized to Restore Community Education (FORCE), which is heading the movement to recall Board President Howard Miller, may stand as another instance. Through all the activities during this period, the most striking characteristic of Bustop's organizational politics has been the prominence of entrepreneurial initiative and top-down organizational change.

These two stages in the history of Los Angeles' central anti-busing organiation correspond closely to a distinction commonly made by theorists of collective action, between defensive and offensive mobilization. In defensive mobilization, a threat from the outside induces the members of a group to pool their resources to fight off the enemy. These are instances of organizational genesis along the lines envisioned by Truman: the group may emerge from a set of uncoordinated simultaneous actions "from the bottom up," and organizational entrepreneurs do

not generally play major roles. The resulting groups may be effective in short-term strikes or protests, but tend to be ephemeral unless more formally organized to take systematic advantage of the resources they have concentrated. Offensive mobilization, on the contrary, usually takes a top-down pattern. In the offensive case, an entrepreneur or small group pools resources in response to new opportunities to advance its interests.[39] During its early period, when the threat was both novel and seemed especially imminent, Bustop's organization resembled that of a defensively mobilized group. The resulting activity was simple, diffuse, and highly individual-expressive. With its admission to the case, a new opportunity for pursuing its interests emerged, but seizing the chance required organizational change. This could only be made from the top down, and it resulted in a set of resource-pooling and resource expenditure activities which are much more concentrated, formally structured, and heirarchical. At the same time, Bustop's leaders have fostered and coordinated the emergence of other groups to take up the slack of old activities now unrelated to the new strategy.

Membership Incentives. The reasons that individuals join in collective activities are critical for an understanding of the ability of the resulting organization to secure resource contributions from members and to engage in group activities.[40] More fundamentally, however, the incentive system of the group is important for assessing whether a particular movement is better described by mass society theories of collective behavior or in terms of theories of interest groups and political organizations.

Clark and Wilson provide a typology which distinguishes among three kinds of incentives. *Material* incentives are tangible rewards. Most commonly, they include money or goods and services which are or can be priced in monetary terms. The acquisition of a desegregated education for one's children, as well as the avoidance of busing (which can be assigned a fairly specific monetary value in terms of the financial sacrifice the family would be willing to make in order to avoid the public schools), can be considered material incentives. Material incentives are the category of goals usually included when behavior is categorized as "objectively self-interested." While the pursuit of one's self-interest has the connotation of selfishness and is therefore sometimes abjured as a public rationale, it is often held as a standard of sensible, reality-based opinionation by political behaviorists and social psychologists.[41]

Solidary incentives are intangible rewards arising out of the act of associating. These incentives are generally collective ones, in the sense that all

organization members share in them equally. Examples include the camaraderie or social prestige members derive from being in the group. Solidary incentives are occasionally somewhat darker than these, however, with "mass society" theorists emphasizing the social support functions that radical groups serve for individual members with personality disorders of varying seriousness.[42]

Purposive incentives are intangible rewards which arise from the sense of satisfaction at having contributed to the attainment of a worthwhile cause. Often these incentives are valued because of their public-regarding, socially benevolent character; purposive groups strive to bring about a new state of affairs which will benefit non-members. Purposive incentives, too, have their disreputable side. For instance, not all public-regarding or altruistic goals are universally beneficial for those involved: not only the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children but the Ku Klux Klan are purposive organizations.

The mass society literature portrays normal political conflict among interest groups and political parties as characterized by rational, incremental, utilitarian bargaining over clearly defined material interests. Collective behavior, on the other hand, is seen typically as an irrational, uncompromising, ideological struggle over values which are not so much interests as *passions*.[43] Solidary and purposive incentives are suspect from this viewpoint, because organizational conflicts animated by them often are (or easily deteriorate into) passionate struggles over unrealistic ideas and goals. Material incentives may be pedestrian and selfish but are at least solidly rooted in real situations: controversies over them are more amenable to mutual adjustment and less likely to be injurious to the individuals involved or to the socio-political system in which the conflict takes place. What can our survey of anti-busing groups in Los Angeles tell us about the balance among these reasons for involvement?

Purposive incentives clearly play a role in stimulating involvement in anti-busing groups. Ideological goals of all sorts are included here: for instance, the broad issue of whether government has the right to transport A's child against A's wishes; or, as in Boston, whether a judge has the right ("legitimate authority") to exercise functions normally performed by an elected school committee; or, more specifically, a concern about the effect on the Chicano community of diluting bilingual programs by dispersing barrio children among Anglo schools. In Los Angeles, a good deal of slogan-mongering operated on this level: anti-busing meetings and Proposition 13 rallies with their "send the politicians a message" flavor were quite similar in this respect. Moreover, the individual participants were

uncomfortable about taking part in public political activity only for the sake of their own children. While these characteristics of the situation tend to produce over-estimates of the socially purposive character of involvement, broad purposive concerns did figure at least marginally in the motivations of nearly all participants, and were central to a few.

Solidary incentives seem to be of minor importance in the anti-busing groups surveyed. Most members did not hold political activity in sufficiently high regard to derive any sense of social esteem from participation, and close personal relations within the organization generally had their roots outside the group and were not dependent on collective group activity for their maintenance. The unimportance of solidary incentives as a means of attracting and holding members should not be taken to imply that the issue has produced political conflict without attenuating occasional friendships.[44] In fact, especially for parents willing to defend their decision to go along with the plan, changes in personal friendship networks have often followed, as this remark by a pro-busing West Valley mother suggests:

> There are some problems with friends. I think the problem is more on my side than on theirs. I find that even in the neighborhood there is a tendency to cling to those who feel similarly and for alienation from those I feel are unreasonable... I value meeting new people who share my views more than I even did before.

This common outcome of community conflict is not the result of group membership, however, but a co-symptom (along with group activity) of the conflict itself.

Interviews with anti-busing organizational leaders and members, however, reveal that the primary reason individuals have for joining and continuing to contribute to the movement is a very immediate concern about their own children. In response to a query about what their group could offer to potential members, organization executives from groups with a wide variety of tactical orientations replied along the lines of this response:

> Our group gives people an efficient way to get involved, to try to stop this busing plan. These people have kids: they don't want them taken an hour or so away into a dangerous ghetto school where no one learns anything.

One leader of Bustop reported that not all the group's contributors have children, but that every active member he knew--"everybody who ever came to a meeting"--

had children in public schools.[45] Taylor and Stinchcombe find similarly that proximate concerns about school violence and about declining test scores figured prominently in the mobilization of opposition to busing in Boston.[46]

While this information is not directly comparable to the studies of public opinion carried out by Gatlin and Sears, our reports from organizational leaders, with their emphasis on the strongly self-interested motivation for group involvement, argues that participatory behavior requires a different explanation from the one these authors give for issue-opinionation as measured by verbal responses in the interview. To the extent that reality-based, materially-induced participation is inconsistent with mass society theories of collective action, moreover, the conception of the anti-busing movement as a conventional political organization is strengthened.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: POLITICAL CONFLICT AND POLITICAL COMMUNITY

The image of the anti-busing movement which emerges from this discussion is clearly inconsistent with mass society theories of collective behavior. Its participants are angry but not outraged; their actions are motivated in part by worries about personal freedom and the future of education in Los Angeles, but a great deal more by the specific material concern with their own children's safety and schooling. Perhaps the most striking organizational feature of these groups and the concerted movement they compose is their loosely inclusive character. Zald and Ash provide a useful distinction between inclusive and exclusive movements:

> The inclusive organization requires minimum levels of initial commitment --a pledge of general support without specific duties... On the other hand, the exclusive organization is likely to hold the new recruit in a long "novitiate" period, to require the recruit to subject himself to organizational discipline and orders... Inclusive and exclusive challenging groups differ not only in recruitment procedures and requirements, but they also differ in the amount of participation required. The inclusive group typically requires little activity from its members-- they can belong to other groups and organizations unselfconsciously, and their behavior is not permeated by organizational goals, policies or tactics.... the exclusive organization not only requires that a greater amount of energy and time be spent in movement affairs, but it more extensively permeates all sections of the members' life, including activities with non-members.[47]

Inclusive movements tend to be involved in political conflicts which are less heated, less likely to be all-out struggles, than exclusive organizations; because the temper of commitment is lower, the tactics employed will generally be more civil.

An important strategic distinction also exists between exclusive and inclusive organizations. In contrast to the ideological intransigence of exclusive movements, inclusive organizations are more often flexible in response to changes in the structure of opportunities for pursuing their goals. The leadership of the anti-busing movement in Los Angeles has been unhesitatingly opportunistic in response to legal ambiguities or school board uncertainties. Finally, inclusive organizations are less faction-prone than exclusive ones. An overriding agreement on the importance of their general goal has repeatedly short-circuited intra-organizational disputes about subgroup autonomy or about the relative importance and visibility of alternative leaders. There is within the anti-busing movement a substantial amount of competition among leaders, as there is in any activist group with a surplus of competent personnel, but this competition occurs in a context of sharply limited personal ambition and a widespread appreciation for the hopelessness of a divided attack.

Not only flexibility but a surprising amount of sophistication in choosing political tactics has been shown by the groups opposed to busing in Los Angeles. Have their organization, strategy, and tactics brought them tangible results? Three important characteristics distinguish the Los Angeles desegregation plan from an administratively optimal policy for moving students among schools to achieve a given level of racial balance. First, it has a substantial voluntary component; second, it emphasizes and fosters local planning among small groups of schools which retain a measure of autonomous control over pupil transfer policies and curriculum offerings within their area; third, the time and distance spent by any child in transit between home and school is a primary constraint on all other dimensions of the plan. A number of other influences besides Bustop and its coalition partners have been active in pressing their demands on the school board as it formulated the plan. Although it is not possible to attribute causation with certainty, by describing each of these facets of the plan in more detail a clearer sense can be gained of the relative importance of the anti-busing movement within this set of influences.

The high level of public opposition in Los Angeles and the demonstrated insufficiency of voluntarism as a solution to segregated schools in other cities led most of those involved in desegregation planning to regard the notion of a voluntary component with kindly skepticism. A period was included in the Citizens Committee plan during which parents could volunteer their children for reassignment which would promote integration. The procedure allowed here, however, was extremely

vague and it was clear from the debate on this component that the predominantly liberal committee did not regard it as a realistic option. The board did eventually expand and formalize the voluntary component, although it should be noted that altering this aspect was the most administratively simple change which could have been made in the plan. While Bustop was vehement in advocating this component, it is likely that the plan would have contained important voluntary aspects whether its proponents had been well-organized or simply noisy.

The notion of allowing small clusters of schools to determine some aspects of their participation in the city-wide plan can be traced to two sources. One of these was pressure from parents in several of the administrative sub-areas of the mammoth Los Angeles district, for the school board to allow the area to desegregate using only the area schools. This would, of course, decrease the distance any child would be bused but, more importantly, it would achieve some measure of racial desegregation while maintaining social class homogeneity. Except in the Harbor area, this proposal is impractical as stated, but district administrators modified the idea and included it in the draft plan which the board debated after rejecting the Citizens Committee proposal. As altered, "local planning" was less a form of parent participation than an attempt to involve principals and lower-level district personnel in the implementation process. The concept passed through several modifications, but as finally implemented, it entailed fairly extensive involvement of parents from the schools within a cluster. Members of the anti-busing movement expressed open suspicion of this scheme, describing it as an attempt to get them to endorse the plan without being able to change it in any meaningful way. The proposal received support from some neutrals and from liberals in favor of desegregation, but it was given little attention by the anti-busing forces, either pro or con.

The third element of the plan which was modified in response to outside pressure is one which places a limit on the maximum amount of time any child can spend on the bus. Given the degree of residential segregation in Los Angeles and the wide geographic dispersion of neighborhoods, this restriction is arguably the most efficient indirect constraint on the overall extent of the plan. Just after their public hearings in 1977, the board voted a plan which would have limited bus rides to 20 minutes one way. Of 259 segregated elementary schools, fewer than 50 could have been integrated within this limitation. When their first plan was rejected by the judge, the board returned with modifications which would have produced an average ride of about 40 minutes, but some rides of more than one hour. The board

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then ferreted out a category of students who, in traffic, would ride 90 minutes one way. This "unreasonable" burden led the judge to order the district to find a way to reduce the rides, with the last-minute midsite proposal as the result. Particularly given the adversarial relationship, Bustop leaders rate Judge Egly surprisingly highly.

In addition to the court proceedings, the school board has responded to anti-busing demands just enough to retain the group as an active complainant rather than having it withdraw to the streets or the suburbs. None has advocated disobeying the court order, and six of the seven have made unequivocal public statements that they will obey the law and deplore illegal or violent responses to busing. The board's obvious responsiveness to anti-busing arguments in the early stages (and the corresponding well-publicized outrage of the plaintiffs), as well as the discomfort several centrist board members periodically express at having to expand the plan, are seen by most anti-busing leaders as genuinely sympathetic in a situation of clear constraints.

Hirschman emphasizes the importance of loyalty in redressing the usual tendency of dissatisfied individuals to favor exit over voice.[48] Loyalty--the sentiment that the district public schools are worth saving, that desegregation can be accomplished without harming educational quality and might even produce some benefits--is best represented by pro-desegregation community groups and spokesmen on the board. Anti-busing leaders and activists had a differentiated image of the opposition. Held in lowest esteem was the ESAA-funded Council for Peace and Equality in Education. Since at least two Bustop leaders are on the Council's umbrella board of directors, anti-busing activists had a good deal of current information about the group. One Bustop executive, who mentioned that she was personally acquainted with the Council's Executive Director, summarized the feelings of several respondents by referring to the group as "a bunch of rich liberal public relations types, profiteering from the busing issue--them and that Eastern foundation of theirs." Grass-roots pro-desegregation organizations are tolerated on condition that they do not try to impose their standards on Bustop members. Bustop leaders were genuinely impressed with the fact that some of the strongest support for an expanded plan came from parents who already sent their children to integrated schools. Reflecting on this, one Bustop member said that it would probably be all right for her child to go to school with "those other kids" too, but that she was still troubled by the distance on the bus and the violence of ghetto schools.

The role of pro-desegregation spokesmen and groups, if moderate rather than radical, seems to be important in eliciting voice rather than exit from anti-busing advocates who know that they cannot win all they want. Because these moderate groups tend to avoid tactics which would contribute to polarization, they are viewed by many anti-busing parents as honest and credible exponents of a valid, if benighted, opinion. They provide dramatic evidence of loyalty, and, by implication, evidence that the system is worth saving. In this sense, it is more their example than their words or arguments (which are familiar and predictable) that tends to slow exit and to contribute to voice.

Most people will tolerate some imperfections and inadequacies in the policies of local governmental units, but if they are sufficiently dissatisfied with a policy, individuals will choose one of two options: exit or voice. Much of the scholarly discussion of school desegregation has focused on preventing exit, while at the same time deploring the active use of voice. Scholars who favored policies emphasizing the market mechanism in the past now find it unconscionable that whites are actually using the exit option, that most economic of responses to perceived quality declines.[49] Simultaneously, these and other scholars lament that anti-busing forces have taken to the streets, or replaced admirable upper middle class local boards with intolerant conservatives. While a rationale which leaves open only the option of passive compliance may be administratively handy, it is impractical at a time when school districts need new ways to find support, and it runs counter to a widely-espoused regime norm favoring participation. The argument of this paper has been that the principal justification for exclusions from the realm of normal politics--the politics of "vested" interests and pluralist bargaining--does not apply to the anti-busing movement in America's largest currently-desegregating city. That the opposition to busing in Los Angeles looks more like an interest group than a mass movement should come as little surprise, for it has, on the whole, been treated as an interest group by both judicial and legislative policy-makers. No direct implications follow from a case study for other similar cases, but the extent to which institutional relations can shape behaviors in this case should give pause to those who would exclude an anti-busing majority *a priori*.

FOOTNOTES

1. Los Angeles Times, January 22, 1977.

2. Op. cit., February 8, 1977.

3. Op. cit., February 17, 1977.

4. Cf. op. cit., February 19, 1977.

5. Op. cit., March 4, 1977.

6. Op. cit., March 5, 1977.

7. Peterson, Paul E., School Politics, Chicago Style (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 155.

8. Peterson, p. 158.

9. The distinction between the force or strength of a political message and the subtlety of its content is made by Verba, Sidney and Normal H. Nie, Participation in America (New York: Harper, 1972), Pt. III.

10. Quoted in Peterson, p. 158.

11. Pitkin, Hanna, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), p. 209-10.

12. On the interpretation of anti-busing attitudes in terms of symbolic racism, cf. McConahay, John B. and Joseph C. Hough, Jr., "Symbolic Racism," J. Social Issues 32, 2 (1976): 23-45; Sears, David O., Carl P. Hensler, and Leslie K. Speer, "Whites' Opposition to 'Busing': Self-Interest or Symbolic Politics?" (UCLA: January, 1978); Gatlin, Douglas S., Michael W. Giles, and Everett F. Cataldo, "Policy Support within a Target Group: The Case of School Desegregation," American Political Science Review, forthcoming. The role of alienation and anomie are emphasized by Taylor, D. Garth and Arthur L. Stinchcombe, "The Boston School Desegregation Controversy," (Chicago: NORC, 1977).

13. Rubin, Lillian, Busing and Backlash (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 49, 72; cf. chs. 6 and 8.

14. Rubin, pp. 95ff.

15. Taylor and Stinchcombe, p. 111. Italics in original.

16. Riesman, David, with Nathan Glazer and Ruel Denney, The Lonely Crowd (Garden City: Doubleday, 1953); Rogin, Michael Paul, The Intellectuals and McCarthy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1967).

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21. Pitkin, Hanna, Wittgenstein and Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), ch. 9.

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23. Gamson, chapter 1.

24. Taylor and Stinchcombe, chapter 4.

25. On the role of organizations as entrepreneurs in the formation of other organizations, see Salisbury, Robert H., "An Exchange Theory of Interest Groups," Midwest Journal of Political Science 13 (1969): 1-32.

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29. Oberschall, p. 174; Coleman, p. 11.

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31. On the notion of "constituency" cf. Gamson, ch. 1.

32. Salisbury, "Exchange Theory."

33. At least two other persons who emerged only later as anti-busing influentials might easily have played Fiedler's role at an earlier stage. One is currently on the executive committee of Bustop and recently sought a seat in the State Assembly; the other is presently heading an effort of recall the unexpectedly liberal president of the school board.

34. Eisinger, "Conditions"; Lipsky, Michael, "Protest as a Political Resource," American Political Science Review 62 (1968), 1144-58; Turner, Ralph, "The Public Perception of Protest," American Sociological Review 34 (1969), 816-30.

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39. Tilly, Mobilization, ch. 3.

40. Clark, Peter B. and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 6 (1961),219-66; Wilson, James Q., Political Organizations (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

41. Cf. Gatlin, et al.; Sears, et al.

42. Cf. Bell, Daniel, The Radical Right (Garden City, New York: Doubleday).

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44. Coleman, Conflict, p. 12.

45. Interestingly enough, the only Bustop member he could think of who did not have children was Paul Clark.

46. Taylor and Stinchcombe, pp. 180ff.

47. Zald, Meyer N. and Roberta Ash, "Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay, and Change," Social Forces 44 (1966): 327-41.

48. Hirschman, Albert O., Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), ch. 7.

49. Cf. Friedman on educational vouchers:

> Parents could express their views about schools directly, by withdrawing their children from one school and sending them to another, to a much greater extent than is now possible. In general they can now take this step only by changing their place of residence. For the rest, they can express their views only through cumbrous political channels.

Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 91.